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AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAGE-ECONOMY 
AND THE TASK OF RESPONSIBLE COMPANIES
By  J. B. KNIGHT*
I must explain at the start that my knowledge of the Rhodesian economy 
is very limited: I do not propose to examine the Rhodesian case directly. I 
have some knowledge of labour markets in certain African countries north 
of the Zambezi, and also of labour markets south of the Limpopo. Compa­
risons with countries to the north and to the south may well provide some 
valuable insights and inferences for the Rhodesian case. Economically — as 
well as geographically — Rhodesia lies somewhere in between them. Poli­
tically, the balance of power in Rhodesia is at present not dissimilar to that in 
South Africa. On the other hand, the future seems to indicate a transfer of 
power in the direction of that prevailing in some African countries to the 
North. I  shall want to argue that the task of responsible companies in matters 
of African employment is closely bound up both with the country’s level of 
economic development and with the political system within which the 
economy operates.
I wish to concentrate on two issues, the level of unskilled wages and 
the structure of earnings. I shall begin by examining the South African case. 
In 1973 a Select Committee of the British House of Commons held a public 
inquiry into the wages and conditions of employment of African workers 
employed by British companies in South Africa. The Committee’s report 
provides a useful framework within which to examine these issues: it too was 
concerned with defining the task of responsible companies.'
I shall assume familiarity with the characteristics of the labour market 
in South Africa, and therefore do no more than outline the relevant features. 
One is the rapid growth of the African population — which averaged 3,2% 
p.a. during the 1960’s. There was a similar percentage growth of the labour 
force. Secondly there was a rapid growth of wage-employment — about 4% 
p.a. over that period. Nevertheless, the absolute number of Africans in the 
so-called ‘Bantu Homelands’ continued to grow. Even in 1955 the Tomlin­
son Commission expressed concern about overcrowding in the Homelands. 
Since 1955 the de facto population density of the Bantu Homelands has almost 
doubled. It is probable that underemployment has increased in the Home­
lands, and that they have become increasingly dependent on the remitted earn­
ings of migrants employed in the wage-economy.
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On the one hand, there is an abundance of unskilled labour, very largely 
African. On the other hand, it is probably the shortage of skilled and educa­
ted manpower — very largely White — which constrains the growth of the 
economy. Market forces operating in these circumstances generate very large 
diferences in earnings from employment, based on skill and education and 
so correlated very closely with race. Nor are there institutional means to 
redress this gap. African trade unions are not illegal, but they enjoy no legal 
rights, and African unionism has been very weak. For majority of Afri­
cans, wages are determined by employers, subject to a minimum imposed 
by supply and demand. All the same, African average real earnings from 
employment increased by some 3,5% p.a. during the 1960’s. Probably this 
was accompanied by a growth in inequality of income among the African 
population, with the urbanised Africans doing best, partly through skill 
acquisition, and those Homeland Africans without wage-sector breadwinners 
doing least well.
I turn to the question of minimum wages for the unskilled. A survey of 
African wages in the private sector in 1972 indicated that most British com­
panies tended to pay roughly ‘the going market rate’ to African employees. At 
the time of the House of Commons inquiry, by contrast, many British compa­
nies claimed to pay more than their competitors. The Committee received a 
lot of evidence of large and rapid wage increases, particularly for the lowest- 
paid, during 1973; whether as a result of the widespread strikes, the press 
publicity, or the inquiry itself. A number of British companies — but by no 
means all — had set wage objectives in terms of the Poverty Datum Line 
(PDL). The PDL dates back to Rowntree in England at the turn of the cen­
tury, and it has probably been developed more in South Africa than any­
where else in Africa. The Committee found no less than 37 different 
PDL estimates relating to 1973. The PDL is normally composed of 
the following items: sufficient food to provide each member of the house­
hold with the nutritional requirements for health; also clothing, fuel 
and light, cleaning materials and transport. Needless to say, there are 
significant differences in the estimates between cities, between town and coun­
try, and even for the same place at the same time. These variations correspond 
to different subjective judgements about minimum needs, differences in the 
prices used, and differences in the assumed size of family. A great problem 
with the PDL is its arbitrariness and subjectivity. Because the PDL excluded 
a number of items on which income is actually spent, another concept was 
introduced, the minimum effective level (MEL), and set at 50% above the 
PDL. The justification for this rule of thumb is that African household ex­
penditure on items which are excluded from the PDL tends to be about half 
that on items which are included.
It is difficult to set up the PDL or the MEL as a hard-and-fast criterion 
for minimum wages. The sorts of problem which arise include the following:
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which PDL to take, where a choice exists? Which wage — basic or including 
various sorts of bonus and fringe benefit — to compare with the PDL? The 
Committee took the view that only elements of the wage which are guaran­
teed and certain should be included for comparison. Should the PDL be 
applied to juvenile and female employees, who are normally not heads of 
households? Should the PDL be divided by 1,4 because total household in­
come averages about 1,4 times that of the household head? The Committee 
rejected this practice because there is evidence that many households do con­
tain only one earner. How can the PDL be applied to migrant workers who 
receive substantial benefits-in-kind and whose dependants live elsewhere? 
The Committee recognised the need to adapt the PDL to take account of 
benefits-in-kind; and it also stressed the need for information about income 
levels in the rural areas. What if no PDL exists for the company’s place of 
operation? Some other PDL would have to be adapted or a new one com­
missioned. The Committee recognised and discussed all these problems; but 
they did not deter the Committee from recommending that companies should 
pay wages in excess of the PDL, at least to all their adult male employees, 
and that they should accept the MEL as the target, to be achieved according 
to a timetable.
The Committee had to bear in mind the possible harmful consequences 
of wage increases implied in its recommendations. Here it relied heavily on 
the evidence placed before it. A number of firms had argued that wage in­
creases for unskilled labour would cause managers to economise on employ­
ment, both by using these workers more efficiently and by substituting machin­
ery and skilled labour for unskilled labour. This was particularly stressed 
for agricultural and forestry estates, where there is plenty of scope for sub­
stitution; but the Committee received little evidence to suggest that it might 
be important in manufacturing. Nevertheless, it recognised that some firms 
faced a serious dilemma and qualified its recommendations accordingly. A 
number of companies complained of the effect of wage increases on their 
rate of profit. Those which pleaded limited ‘capacity-to-pay’ were often sub­
ject to price controls or to fierce competition; their problem would arise if 
they stepped significantly out of line from their competitors. Others were not 
in this position, and a number expressly said that low profitability would 
not impose a constraint on African wages. This is not surprising in view of 
the remarkably low proportion of total costs which African wage costs con­
stituted in many cases. A number of the more progressive companies recog­
nised the advantages to themselves of paying higher wages — high wages 
were said to improve the quality of labour recruitment and retention and to 
improve motivation. The Committee was not unmindful of the disadvantages, 
as well as the advantages, of British affiliates raising African wages — but 
it had to weigh them all up on the basis of the evidence presented to it, and 
find the right balance.
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Another important issue on which the Committee made recommenda­
tions was the training and promotion of Africans, and the racial wage 
structure. In general there was not much divergence between these recom­
mendations and the stated objectives of companies. Given the great shortage 
of skilled labour, companies had a profit incentive to train and advance non- 
Whites. However, companies appeared to be limited in what they could do. 
They were limited by custom and practice, by the fear of legal job reserva­
tion, by the limited education of many Blacks, and particularly by the oppo­
sition of registered trade unions and White workers. However, many wit­
nesses claimed that significant job advancement of Africans had occurred in 
recent years.
In some companies there was a complete division between the work done 
by Whites and that done by Africans. At the dividing line there was often 
a large wage gap. In others a single non-racial wage structure was to be 
found, and there was in some of these cases a significant overlap in jobs done 
by the different races. These two different wage and employment structures 
reflect two different methods of advancing Africans into more skilled jobs. 
The first, where there is no overlap, retains the colour bar but moves it up­
wards in the hierarchy of jobs. Quite often there is so-called ‘job fragmenta­
tion’ and Africans take over previously White jobs at lower rates of pay 
and possibly — but not necessarily — lower degrees of skill. The second me­
thod is for Africans to join White workers and receive ‘equal pay for equal 
work’. If African advancement is limited by the hostility of White workers 
or their trade unions, the application of this principle can serve to accele­
rate the promotion of Africans by providing security for White workers 
against the undercutting of their wages. Now, clearly there can be circums­
tances in which the payment of the rate for the job would actually retard 
the promotion of Africans This result would be most likely to occur Afri­
can workers were less efficient than their White counterparts, or if employ­
ers through prejudice preferred to employ Whites rather than Africans 
unless the latter involved a profit advantge, and if there was no overall 
shortage of skilled labour In fact the Committee received some evidence 
to suggest that African workers were often better than the Whites they re­
placed — which is not in the least surprising since the best of the African 
workers were replacing the least successful of the Whites. But the main 
reason why ‘the rate for the job’ would probably assist African advance­
ment is the overwhelming shortage of skills of every type, which means that 
Whites do not feel threatened provided they are able to determine the wage.
It was for these reasons that the Commttee recommended that com­
pany wage structure should be determined irrespective of race, according 
to the principles of job evaluation. However, it realised that this might prove 
difficult to achieve if White unions used their bargaining power to obtain 
wage increases in the jobs reserved for Whites in return for concessions on
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African advancement into other jobs.
A number of witnesses before the Committee pointed out — and there 
is no good reason to doubt them — that their companies paid lower wages 
in other countries of Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. It sounds an 
odd sort of defence — “If you think this is low, just see what we can do when 
we really try” — but it was used. The Committee kept to its terms of reference, 
and all it would venture to say was the following: “Poverty is poverty wher­
ever it is encountered, but, like the Department of Trade and Industry, we 
believe that South Africa is a rather special case”. But, if there is a case, based 
on company reputation or on morality, against British companies paying low 
wages in South Africa, does it not also apply in other low-wage countries? 
Another problem: What if the advice given to firms runs counter to the 
policies of the country’s government? After all, there are some governments, 
including some in Black Africa, which pursue a policy of wage restraint, 
policies of the country’s government? After all, there are some governments. 
First, let me explain briefly the evolution of labour markets and wage policies 
in Black Africa.
Some 20 years ago most African countries were colonies, very little in­
dustrialised, possessing only small urban populations, many of whom were 
temporary migrants from the rural areas. A stable urban African proletariat 
had not yet emerged to the extent that it had in the industrially more advanced 
South Africa. Today, the urban labour force in many an African country is 
probably more stabilised, containing a smaller proportion of temporary 
migrants, than in South Africa. This change is worth exploring: it is closely 
connected with the behaviour of wages. In African conditions, where farmers 
are willing to offer their services in the towns as wage-labour on a temporary 
basis, the supply curve of rural labour is frequently little higher than the 
cost of supporting a single man in the town. If market forces operate, the 
unskilled wage rate is kept at this level by competition, and it is difficult for 
the economy to emerge automatically from the system of low wages, low 
productivity and inefficient migrant labour. This may occur if employers 
find that they have an incentive to take the initiative. With the growth of 
industry and modem services, there is an increasing demand for semi-skilled 
and skilled workers in these activities. Skills require training and training is 
wasted if labour is temporary. Employers may, therefore, wish to pay wages 
sufficiently high to encourage their semi-skilled and skilled workers to settle 
in the town. Their wages become based on the alternative income of a family 
rather than that of a single migrant. Employers are less likely to expect that 
the wages of unskilled workers can profitably be raised. Even in the case of 
unskilled labour, large capital-intensive companies may choose to raise wages 
above market levels, because the effect on profits is often very small and 
because they see the payment of high wages as a form of insurance in a 
potentially hostile environment: it may be a way of securing the loyalty of
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employees, of avoiding charges of ‘exploitation’, and of reducing the threat 
of nationalisation.
There are instances in Black Africa of governments taking the initiative 
to raise unskilled wages. This has been done, either by means of wage 
leadership or minimum wage legislation, as a deliberate policy of stabilising 
labour or as a response to political pressures from urban workers. In some 
African countries trade unions have become important. But because it is dif­
ficult to organise uncommitted, migrant workers, unions are likely to become 
influential only after wage rises and labour stabilisation have got under way.
Real wages have indeed risen very rapidly in many African countries 
over the last 20 years; at the same time the urban labour force has become 
more stabilised. The growing gap between rural incomes and prospective real 
wages in the town induced a large inflow of labour from the rural areas. It 
also produced growing urban unemployment and underemployment among 
those who could not find modem sector jobs. Those who could find modern 
sector jobs clung onto them; they became committed urban workers, living 
with their families and expecting to stay in the towns for many years.
Rapidly increasing real wages, rising well above rural incomes, have led 
various economists to recommend policies of wage restraint. The sorts of 
argument in favour of such restraint include the following:
1. Wage increases cause employers to substitute capital, skilled labour and 
improved management for unskilled labour, so reducing employment. 
The same result occurs in the public sector, where a budget constraint 
forces cuts in employment.
2. Wage increases raise costs and so reduce the profitability of production 
in sectors where competition from abroad or price controls prevent pro­
fits from being restored by means of price increases. As a result produc­
tion, investment and employment suffer.
3. Wage increases affect saving adversely, by redistributing income from 
profits to wages, and so from those who save much to those who save 
little; hence saving is reduced. In so far as wages are more difficult to 
tax than profits, the redistribution also reduces taxation and hence 
public saving.
4. In so far as wage increases result in increased prices of modem sector pro­
ducts, the real income of those in the rural areas is reduced.
5. Wage increases, although they reduce differentials within the modem 
sector, create greater inequality between the modern sector and the 
rural areas.
6. This growing inequality in income as between the rural areas and the 
modem sector attracts people to the towns. The effect is to harm agri­
culture and to cause urban unemployment and poverty in urban tradi­
tional sector activities.
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7. Wage increases raise the cost of various public services, and so dimi­
nish their provision.
8. The redistribution of income implied by the wage increases may tighten 
the foreign exchange constraint on development by increasing the de­
mand for imports or deterring the inflow of foreign capital.
But the arguments do not all run in one direction. Wage increases have, 
after all, broken down the system of migratory labour, which is often eco­
nomically inefficient and is regarded as socially harmful Wage increases 
may help to raise labour efficiency also by improving the nutrition, health 
and incentive of workers. Another argument is that urban workers have 
a high propensity to spend additional income on domestically produced 
manufactures; wage increases, therefore, raise the demand for industrial 
products, and — so the argument runs — it is lack of demand which con­
strains industrial development which should be encouraged because it is 
subject to externalities. A social argument in favour of a rural-urban income 
gap is that poverty is a relative thing, and that urban workers — as a result 
of living in town — become more acquisitive and frustrated than rural 
people.
It is one thing to set out these arguments, quite another to establish 
their quantitative importance. Detailed case studies of the effects of wage 
behaviour in African countries are as yet sparse and inconclusive. However, 
at least four sets of economists (including myself) have examined Zambian 
wages since the time of Independence, and all have come out in favour of 
wage restraint. Moreover, that is now the policy of the Zambian Govern­
ment. And yet — as far as one can judge — African wages in Zambian 
manufacturing are no higher than in South African manufacturing; and in 
East Africa they are almost certainly lower. If the responsible employer is 
expected to raise unskilled wages in South Africa, should he not also do so 
in those Black African countries in which unskilled wages are just as low? 
Is South Africa a special case?
Before considering this question, 1 wish to say a little about wage 
structure in Black Africa. At the time of Independence, most African 
countries inherited a very inegalitarian structure of wages, possibly more 
unequal even than that in South Africa. The income of professional and 
highly skilled people was determined by whatever was necessary to attract 
them from Europe. In the period shortly before Independence, the advance­
ment of local people to professional and administrative ranks was general y 
accompanied by a demand for ‘equal pay for equal work’, which in many 
cases was acceded to by the colonial authorities. At Independence the Euro­
pean workers received an ‘overseas addition’ or ‘expatriate allowance m 
addition to the basic pay, to compensate them for becoming expatriates w o 
would be employed only for as long as they were needed. The introduction
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of an ‘expatriate allowance’ meant that it was now possible for local sala­
ries to fall, and those African governments concerned to achieve greater 
equality of income attempted to do this. But there were two obstacles. One 
was market forces: with acute scarcities of high-level manpower, competing 
employers in the private and parastatal sector, bid up the price of this 
scarce factor. Secondly, there was the political strength of the new educated 
61ite: this was used to protect their earnings in the dominant public sector. 
The present situation of great inequality is likely to continue until the ra­
pidly expanding educational system begins to turn out excessive supplies 
of educated people. Only then, with the disappearance of the expatriates 
and much greater competition to get jobs, will the premium paid for educa­
tion be shaken down significantly.
The implications of this analysis is that in many Black African coun­
tries the responsible employer will be paying different rates for the same 
job, a lower one to citizens and a higher one to non-citizens employed tempo­
rarily. In practice, because the citizen/non-citizen division often corresponds 
with the African/European division, it may appear that the em­
ployer is practising racial discrimination. However, this discrimination be­
tween citizens and non-citizens is encouraged and indeed practised by 
government, in an attempt to ensure greater equality of income wtihin the 
society in the long run.
I come back to the question of whether a responsible employer should 
pursue any different policy for unskilled wages in South Africa than in Black 
Africa. On one main count, South Africa is not a special case. It too appears 
to have a problem of underemployment. In South Africa and Black Africa 
alike, the need for employment creation is a strong one However, a dis­
tinction can be made in at least two respects.
South Africa does differ from many Black African countries in that a 
significant part — perhaps half — of the African labour force engaged in 
the modem sector are migrant workers. High payments to migrants do 
spread, via remittances to dependants, to the poorest section of the popula­
tion in the Bantu Homelands. Only 26% of adult male Africans were in 
the Bantu Homelands at the time of the 1970 census, and some of these 
may have ben ‘resting’. In Black Africa only a small minority of workers 
benefit from wage increases, whereas in South Africa the majority of Afri­
cans do so. Even if the growth of employment is restricted as a result of 
wage increases, provided that the elasticity of demand for labour is less 
than unity, the wage bill will rise; and so also, very likely, will remittances 
to the Homelands. Only those Homeland families whose breadwinners are 
deprived of wage employment by the wage increases will actually suffer.
Perhaps the basic difference between South Africa and other African 
countries lies in the nature of their governments? It would be contrary to
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human nature in the mass if the South African government, elected by an 
all-White electorate, did not primarily pursue the interests of the Whites. 
It is plausible that the government pursues the economic welfare of Africans 
only in so far as the electorate perceives that to be in their interests. But 
one might well ask who it is that the governments of various African coun­
tries represent? It is a plausible hypothesis that, in a number of countries, 
the mass of the people on the land tend to be neglected through their lack 
of voice, organisation and effective power.
It is arguable that a policy of holding down unskilled wages is morally 
justified only as a  part of a more general government policy for achieving 
a more equitable distribution of income, i.e., it is unfair to impose sacrifice 
on wage-earners in the interests of the poorest if sacrifice is not also imposed 
on the richest. It follows that a policy of restraining unskilled wages could be 
justified neither in South Africa nor in a number of other African countries. 
But that is not the only value judgement which might be made. If  it can be 
shown that the poorest do benefit significantly, then the case for wage-restraint 
as a  second-best policy may still stand.
Even if a case can be made out for a policy of wage restraint in the 
interests of the community as a whole, is that really a matter for the indivi­
dual employer? Should his responsibility not lie primarily with his own 
employees? But if the government has formulated a policy of wage restraint, 
is it responsible action for an employer to raise the minimum wage to the 
PDL or MEL level in defiance of government policy? Basically, the respect 
one gives to a government and the extent to which one acknowledges its 
right to formulate policies for its subjects must depend on a value judge­
ment. Even if government is fully respected, the individual employer nor­
mally has some discretion, because government wage policies are often 
rather imprecise. The South African Government has a stated policy of 
narrowing the racial wage gap, although it has not used its own consider­
able powers to any great extent, in the pursuit of this objective. The poli­
cies of those African Governments pursuing wage restraint are inevitably 
fairly flexible. So employers often do have some measure of choice within 
the overall framework of government policy.
My general conclusion is that there may well be a case for distinguishing 
between South Africa and some Black African countries in the matter of 
company wage policy. South Africa differs in at least two respects. First, 
the much greater level of economic development in South Africa means 
that a far higher proportion of Africans are engaged in the wage-economy, 
so that a much larger part of the African population stands to gain, and a 
smaller part stands to lose, as a result of wage increases in the wage- 
economy. Secondly, there is the political point. Wage increases for Africans 
in the modem sector are in conformity with stated government policy in
5 6 THE RHODESIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
South Africa, and against government policy in some countries of Black 
Africa. Moreover, wage increases for Africans tend to help most of the 
people who are politically under-represented in South Africa, whereas in 
many Black African countries, wage increases in the modem sector tend to 
help a small group already possessing disproportionate political power, 
the urban workers; and may harm the often neglected masses in peasant 
agriculture.
Finally what is the implication of all this for wages policy in Rhode­
sia? I have suggested that Rhodesia lies somewhere between South Africa 
and Black Africa in the extent of African participation in the wage-economy. 
The precise extent of participation determines the number of Africans who 
gain and the number who lose from modem sector wage increases. This 
is an important consideration in determining a wages policy. Another con­
sideration is the quantitative extent of gains and losses. For instance, to what 
extent do increases in money wages paid to African workers result in real 
wage increases? Will these gains be inflated away as a result of the political 
and economic power of other groups? To what extent do peasant farmers 
lose as a result of wage increases in the modem sector, e.g., as a result 
of the reduction in, or slower growth of, wage-employment, or as a result of 
higher prices of the goods they buy? Politics cannot be ignored, but it is not 
easy to say anything sensible on this in the present state of uncertainty 
about Rhodesia’s political future. Government wage policies now and in 
the future may well be determined primarily by a political factor — whether 
it reflects, e.g., a lack of concern for the unrepresented, or a need to placate 
township discontent, or a response to a disproportionately powerful pressure 
group, or a growing concern for the welfare of those outside the wage- 
economy. Given government wages policy, the responsible employer will 
normally have to operate within that framework. But he will still have some 
scope for choice, given the usual amount of flexibility in policy.
Beware the foreign expert who flies in and offers instant economic ad­
vice! My intention has been simply to provide a conceptual framework 
within which participants in the symposium can examine the Rhodesian 
case. However, if in conclusion I may be allowed to offer an opinion about 
Rhodesia in its current state of political and economic development, it is 
that the recommendations on African wage levels and wage structure in 
South Africa, which were made by the House of Commons Committee, 
should be seriously considered also by responsible employers in Rhodesia.
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